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The Internet as Idea: For a Transcendental Philosophy of Technology 
Dominic Smith 
 
Abstract: This article attempts to render the Internet an object of philosophical 
consideration. It does so by referring to Kant’s transcendental approach. The argument is 
that Kant’s “transcendental idealism” is one example of an approach focused on conditions 
that much contemporary philosophy of technology misunderstands or ignores. Diverse 
contemporary thinkers are engaged, including Verbeek, Brey, Stiegler, Clark and Chalmers, 
Feenberg, and Fuchs. The article considers how these thinkers stand in relation to 
tendencies towards determinism, subjectivism and excessive forms of optimism and 
pessimism in relation to the Internet. In terms of Kant’s transcendental idealism, I argue that 
contemporary philosophy of technology does not go far enough in considering the Internet 
as a “regulative idea.” In terms of broader transcendental approaches, I argue that openness 
to the transcendental calls into question presuppositions regarding what constitutes an 
“empirical” object of enquiry, opening philosophy of technology to important new areas of 
research.  
 
 
Key words: Internet, philosophy of technology, transcendental argument, transcendental 
turn, Kant, regulative idea 
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Introduction 
This article argues for a “transcendental” approach to philosophy of technology by 
considering a concrete technological artefact, the Internet.1 To see why this may seem 
paradoxical, consider the following from Peter-Paul Verbeek: 
 
[Classical] philosophy of technology … approached its subject matter from a 
transcendental direction. Transcendental philosophy, which achieved its zenith in 
the work of Immanuel Kant, takes as its point of departure the [382] analysis of 
conditions of possibility ... [that] overstep and transcend … empirical reality…. The 
philosophy of technology needs to resist this “Orphic temptation” of looking 
backward. It must be confident that it will be able to get a full view of technology 
once it has left the realm of the transcendental and reenters the world of concrete 
materiality. (Verbeek 2005, 7-8, original emphasis) 
 
Here, Verbeek expresses a doxa or “common sense” prevalent throughout much 
contemporary philosophy of technology.2 This view implies that, before an “empirical turn” 
in the 1990s, philosophy of technology tended to be too “transcendental” (Verbeek 2011, 
160). On this account, “classical philosophy of technology” failed to engage real 
technological artefacts in design, context, and use, and instead tended, in error, to reify 
“Technology” into a monolithic transcendental force beyond human reason and control 
(Achterhuis 2001, 3; Verbeek 2005, 2011; Brey 2008, 19-21, 2010; Feenberg 1999, 183; 
2002, 9; 2009). 
Against the doxa, this article argues that philosophy of technology has not been 
transcendental enough. By this, I mean that wherever philosophy of technology has tended 
to caricature the “transcendental” in the way outlined above, it has ignored the logical 
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coherence and genealogical influence of the “transcendental” as an approach to argument 
in philosophy. The “transcendental,” as this article will characterise it, need not be 
construed as an otherworldly, abstract, or “transcendent” realm that calls on us to indulge 
an “Orphic temptation” of looking away from the empirical. Instead, drawing on 
considerations from authors such as Stroud (1968) and Stern (2013), I will argue that the 
“transcendental” should be read in terms of a form of argument that enquires into 
conditions for given empirical phenomena, and, moreover, that transcendental approaches 
can be acutely and immanently attuned to the empirical. To demonstrate the coherence of 
these claims, I will attempt to develop a “transcendental” approach to the Internet, a 
technological artefact which, as I will seek to show, calls into question established 
presuppositions about what constitutes an “empirical” object of enquiry. To demonstrate 
the genealogical influence of the “transcendental” in the history of philosophy, I will attempt 
to contextualise this approach in terms of a return to Kant. 
The article is comprised of four parts. Part one states the case for viewing the 
Internet as an idea. By “idea,” I mean that the Internet is a cultural phenomenon broader 
than the hardware, software, and types of usership implicated in it. In addition to those 
elements, the Internet is a set of values or norms implicated in regulating the contemporary 
experience of what it is to know, think, communicate, and be. The intention in describing the 
Internet in this manner is not to commit [383] to a form of “idealism,”3 nor to reify it into an 
autonomous or technologically deterministic force;4 rather, it is to attempt to render it an 
object of coherent philosophical consideration and critique, in terms of a set of norms with 
the capacity to impact diverse empirical contexts of contemporary life, both online and 
offline. 
Part two uses examples from contemporary philosophy of technology (principally: 
Stiegler, and Clark and Chalmers) to argue that failure to approach the Internet as an idea 
can lead to determinist and subjectivist approaches to it. Through recourse to popular 
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literature on the Internet (principally: Schmidt and Cohen, and Carr), I argue that determinist 
and subjectivist approaches lend support to rhetorical excesses of optimism and pessimism, 
and that they can be resisted by a more thoroughgoing transcendental approach focused on 
the conditions of the Internet. I conclude this part by situating Feenberg’s “Critical Theory of 
Technology” (2010) and Fuchs’ “Critical Media and Information Studies” (2011) as 
approaches that in some ways run counter to the “empirical turn” doxa in contemporary 
philosophy of technology by having explicitly transcendental elements. 
Part three outlines four clusters of value pertaining to the Internet, considered as an 
idea. These are not intended to be exhaustive or uncontroversial; rather, they are intended 
to be suggestive, in the hope that they may contribute to a more general transcendental 
attempt at identifying norms that contribute to making the Internet possible. The norms 
described are: 1) Neutrality; 2) Unity and Familiarity; 3) Connectivity, Novelty and Speed; 4) 
Supersession and Integration. 
Part four concludes by arguing for a shift in perspective on these norms. I begin by 
arguing that Kant would describe the Internet as a “regulative idea.” In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant discusses three famous “regulative ideas” – “God”, the “soul”, and the “world” 
(Kant 2000, 605-623). His claim is that the entities referred to by these ideas can never be 
the object of a direct experience, but that they should nevertheless be presupposed as 
norms in order to give human conduct sense and unity; that is, that the limits of human 
reason require that human beings should act “as if” God, the soul and the world exist in 
order to give sense and unity to thought and experience. Having argued that Kant would 
view the relationship between “the Internet” and its users in a similar way, the article 
concludes by considering where this leaves transcendental approaches that do not accept 
Kant’s metaphysical and normative presuppositions on the limits and purposes of human 
reason (such as those of Nietzsche, Derrida or Deleuze, for example). My claim is that such 
approaches expose the contingency of Kant’s “as if,” and that, in doing so, they point 
 5 
towards the potential for a broad “transcendental turn” in philosophy of technology. This 
turn would not seek to repudiate the “empirical turn,” rather, [384] it would seek to draw on 
the lineage of the transcendental approach in philosophy to be better focused on both 
“empirical” issues of fact and “transcendental” issues concerning   conditions for these facts. 
  
1. What Is the Internet? 
Following the contributions of Kant’s critical philosophy, there exists a precise way to define 
an object in philosophy. It consists of first describing the object as it appears, then analysing 
conditions under which its appearance is possible. The first task is empirical, in that it aims 
to establish the facts of the object. The second is “transcendental,” in that it enquires into 
conditions that must be in place for facts concerning the object to be possible. As Stroud 
elaborates, using the terms of Kant’s “transcendental idealism”: 
 
Kant recognised two distinct questions which can be asked about concepts. The first 
– “the question of fact”- amounts to “How do we come to have this concept, and 
what is involved in our having it?”… But even if we knew what experiences or mental 
operations had been required … for us to have the concepts we do, Kant’s second 
question – the “question of right” – would still not have been answered, since we 
would not yet have established our right to, or our justification for, the possession 
and employment of those concepts. (1968, 241) 
 
Together, the two questions identified here of “fact” and “right” form the transcendental 
approach in philosophy. It will be the task of this article to apply this to a specific object, the 
Internet. The rationale for doing so is, first, to consider how this object is manifest today, 
and, second, to render it susceptible to critique in terms of its conditions. 
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There is an important sense in which the article will deviate from Stroud. This is 
because I take his approach to be too narrow – by focusing on “concepts”, Stroud focuses on 
how transcendental arguments are to be employed in the Kantian epistemological tradition 
to refute the skeptic. In contrast, this article will focus on how transcendental arguments can 
be used in a wider sense, as part of any enquiry into the conditions of an object (whether 
“realist” or “idealist”).5 
As discussed in the introduction, the article will also deviate from much “empirical 
turn” philosophy of technology, where “transcendental” is used to describe “classical” 
approaches that are viewed as insufficiently empirical, in the vein of Heidegger, Ellul, Jaspers 
and Arendt (Brey 2008, 19-22; 2010; Verbeek 2005, 2011). This is because I take this move to 
be too broad: by including diverse think-[385]-ers under the “classical” banner, 
contemporary philosophy of technology tends towards caricaturing the transcendental in 
the same way that it takes “classical” thinkers to caricature “Technology”. 
  The first question to be posed, then, concerns the empirical facts: how does the 
Internet appear to its users at this juncture of history? We might answer in terms of the 
following information circuit: as “output,” the Internet is information transmitted from the 
screen or speakers of a networked item of information and communication technology (ICT), 
through the human eye or ear, to the visual cortex or primary auditory cortex of the brain; 
as “input,” it is information uploaded to networked computer databases, via various tactile, 
visual or auditory devices. 
There are, of course, a host of further facts that must be in place for the Internet to 
function on this level. First, hardware (intended here in the broad sense of everything from 
fibre-optic cabling and wi-fi terminals, to computer processors, keyboards and mobile phone 
touch-screens) must be machined and assembled. Second, software (including background 
programming and foreground text and image-driven browsers), must be installed and 
functioning. Third, an Internet usership is presupposed. This usership has varied historically. 
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Today, however, it is taken to incorporate all manner of human roles, titles, and activities, in 
principle, if not in fact. What we call “the Internet,” then, in broad de facto terms, is an 
information circuit conditioned by three classes of element: hardware, software, and types 
of usership. These elements should be termed “empirical” because the role they play in 
constituting the Internet is, in principle, observable and measurable.6 
The second transcendental question concerns conditions that must be in place for 
empirical facts concerning the Internet to be possible. This must be posed because the 
Internet cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of its empirical elements. 
First, the Internet is not simply the hardware making it possible. This is because it is 
not any of its material parts in isolation, and because these parts are subject to historical 
change. This is to say that the Internet is no more a fibre optic cable than a networked 
database or computer keyboard: first, because these are parts in a larger material whole; 
second, because every part of this whole is, in principle, replaceable. To illustrate, consider 
that the tendency at the fundamental level of Internet hardware for the past twenty years 
has been for fibre optic cabling to replace “twisted pair” copper telephone wiring (Miller 
2005). From here, the current tendency is towards a hybrid between fibre-optics and 
wireless, and, further, towards “next generation wireless networks” (Santi 2012). The point 
is that [386] “the Internet” is irreducible to these elements insofar as it is presupposed to 
endure their changes. 
Second, the Internet is not reducible to the software making it possible. This is 
because this software presupposes hardware as its material base, and because, in doing so, 
it is subject to the same mereological conditions (that is, relations between “parts” and 
“wholes”) as hardware: just as the Internet cannot be reduced to background software like 
Linux or MS-Powershell, nor can it be reduced to the foreground text and image driven 
software these make possible, from browsers like Firefox and Internet Explorer to iTunes or 
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the latest iPhone app. As with hardware, then, “the Internet” is something in excess of the 
software making it possible (Zittrain 2008; Chun 2011, 3; Schäfer 2011, 68). 
Third, the Internet is not reducible to any of the types of usership involved in it. This 
is because these activities presuppose the material and formal conditions engineered by 
hardware and software, and because, in doing so, they too are subject to historical change. 
Fifteen years ago, for example, it would have been appropriate to analyse Internet usership 
primarily in relation to material conditions set by desktop computers. Given advancements 
in wireless networks and mobile ICTs, however, such a treatment would be anachronistic 
today. Again, fifteen years ago, some authors still described the Internet in terms of “virtual 
reality” (Graham 1999). Today, however, the tendency towards the realisation of what 
Weiser famously described as “ubiquitous computing” (1991) means that it makes more 
sense to describe the contemporary user’s relationship in terms of what Castells has called 
“real virtuality”: 
 
With the prospects of expanding infrastructure and declining prices, it is not a 
prediction but an observation to say that on-line communities are fast developing 
not as a virtual world, but as a real virtuality integrated with other forms of 
interaction in an increasingly hybridized everyday life…. [A] new culture is forming, 
the culture of real virtuality, in which the digitised networks of multimodal 
communication have become so inclusive of all cultural expressions and personal 
experiences that they have made virtuality a fundamental dimension of our reality. 
(Castells 2010, xxix-xxxi, original emphasis) 
 
A more commonplace way of describing related changes occurs in recent discussions of the 
shift towards “Web 2.0” and related concepts of “social” and “participatory” media. 
Consider, for example, the following [387]: 
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There [was] never a shortage of celebratory and condemnatory popular discourse 
about the Internet – even in its early days. Yet, the popular discourse was quieted as 
the hopes and dreams of the Internet … faded with the burst of the dot-com bubble 
in the 1990s and the rise of control and surveillance over and through ICTs after 
September 11, 2001. The advent of Web 2.0, with its newly proclaimed potential and 
promise, however, has rejuvenated the hopes and dreams of enthusiasts of the 
Internet and has renewed the popular discourse. (Wong 2013, 191) 
 
That it is possible to describe such changes in usership over a fifteen-year period (from 
sedentary to mobile, from “virtual reality” to “real virtuality,” towards “Web 2.0”) serves as 
indirect proof that “the Internet” is presupposed, in each case, to be irreducible to these 
changes. To develop this, note the role of the term in Wong’s description: “the Internet” is 
the constant around which “popular discourse” varies. On an engineering level, this is 
because the Internet literally is the “expanding infrastructure” referred to by Castells; on a 
broader socio-cultural level, however, it is arguable that it is because “the Internet” serves in 
a more metaphorically “infrastructural” sense – as a master term in the language-games of 
contemporary ICT users. In either case, however, the result remains the same: “the Internet” 
is the relative constant against which types of usership change. 
Although a treatment of conditions set by hardware, software and types of usership 
is necessary for a consideration of the Internet, it is not sufficient. At most, “the Internet” 
seems to be operative through these elements, without being reducible to any of them. 
How, then, might a more sufficient understanding be gained? In what remains of this article, 
I will suggest that it may be fruitful to approach the Internet transcendentally, as an “idea.” 
By “idea,” I mean an identifiable set of norms materialised in diverse states of 
affairs. As outlined earlier, my intention in describing the Internet in this way is not to 
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commit to idealism, nor to reify it into an autonomous or technologically deterministic force. 
Rather, the claim is that such a set of norms, along with hardware, software, and types of 
usership, is “co-constitutive” of the total phenomenon of the Internet; that is, that a set of 
norms concerning what the Internet is develops in historical tandem and reciprocal 
determination with a set of facts including hardware, software, and types of usership. As I 
will seek to show, approaching the Internet in this way complements established philosophy 
of technology approaches to “embedded values” (Brey 2000, Introna and Nissenbaum 
2000). However, I will also attempt to show that the way of approaching the Internet I 
propose is capable of expanding upon these  established approaches, by being better placed, 
[388] for example, to account for how norms embedded in one technological context can 
transcend it and influence others (for example: how norms embedded in the Internet can 
influence ostensibly “offline” life). 
 
2. Determinism, Subjectivism, Optimism, Pessimism 
Before attempting to outline some of the  norms implicated in the idea of the Internet, it will 
be useful to consider the limitations of approaches that do not proceed in this way. This part 
therefore has three main aims: 1) to highlight problematic tendencies towards determinism 
and subjectivism in contemporary philosophy of technology; 2) to highlight excessive forms 
of optimism and pessimism in recent popular literature on the Internet that these 
tendencies support; 3) to show how approaches to the political and sociological dimensions 
of the Internet, such as those of Feenberg (2009, 2010) and Fuchs (2011), involve 
transcendental elements that render them better placed to critically engage the excesses 
described. 
Consider the case of Bernard Stiegler, one of the foremost contemporary 
philosophers of technology in the “continental” tradition. In his key work, Technics and Time 
(1998), Stiegler lays down this principle: “the following work aims to establish that organised 
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inorganic [i.e. technical] beings are originarily… constitutive…of temporality as well as 
spatiality” (Stiegler 1998, 17, original emphasis). This principle, axiomatic for Stiegler’s work 
since Technics and Time (1998, 14, 25, 83; 2004, 90; Stiegler, Giffard, and Fauré 2009, 42), 
and applied in his recent output to ICTs and the Internet (Stiegler et al. 2008, 74-82), causes 
him to tend towards a strong technological determinism. Usually, technological determinism 
is marked by the claim that technology “…[induces] certain societal effects with necessity” 
(Fuchs 2011, 113), or, stronger, “…that technology causes or determines the structure of the 
rest of society and culture” (Dusek 2006, 84). Stiegler’s determinism is stronger still, 
however, as the inverted Kantianism involved in his reference to “temporality” and 
“spatiality” implies. The point is that, for Kant, time and space are a priori ideal conditions 
for the possibility of human experience, while, for Stiegler, the experience of time and space 
is materially constituted by technology. Stiegler’s claim, then, is not that technologies are 
merely one set of conditions that contribute, like economic or social conditions, to the 
constitution of the human; rather, he takes a reified form of “Technology,” at once 
hyperbolically and ambiguously, to be the definitive ontological condition of the human. In 
his terms, technics “invents the human” (Stiegler 1998, 134-179; 2010, 108; 2012, 258) 
[389]. 
It is possible to view Stiegler as the latest in a long line of “continental” thinkers 
tending towards technological determinism, including Heidegger, Ellul, Arendt, and Jaspers. 
As we have seen, a tendency in contemporary philosophy of technology is to gather these 
figures under “classical” thought. One issue with this is that it tends towards caricaturing 
“classical” thought and the “transcendental”; another, however, is that it may cause 
contemporary philosophy of technology to overlook other problematic tendencies in its 
midst, beyond determinism. 
    Consider, for example, Clark and Chalmers’ famous article “The Extended Mind,” 
where they make the following statement in favour of an “active externalism”: 
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If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were 
it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the 
cognitive process, then that part of the world is… part of the cognitive process. 
(Clark and Chalmers 2011, 222, original emphasis) 
 
The “parity principle” outlined here makes no reference to technologies and is not 
technologically deterministic; rather, it seeks to overcome an ontological deadlock between 
“internalism” and “externalism” in contemporary philosophy of mind, in favour of a more 
pragmatic approach to embodied “environmental” cognition (Clark 2010; Fodor 2009). 
However, a problem does emerge from Clark and Chalmers’ reflections on the scope of their 
principle: 
 
If the [thesis of active externalism] is accepted, how far should we go? All sorts of 
puzzle cases spring to mind…. Does the information in my Filofax count as part of my 
memory? .... Do I believe the contents of the page in front of me before I read it? Is 
my cognitive state somehow spread across the Internet? (Clark and Chalmers 2011, 
231) 
 
Here, a Filofax, a page of text, and the Internet are presupposed to be qualitatively similar 
external “parts of the world.” While such a levelling may be useful for an approach centred 
on subjective cognitive processes (Menary 2006; Hurley 2010), the problem from a 
philosophy of technology perspective is that it ignores technologically relevant differences in 
value in a way that is symptomatic of Clark and Chalmers’ “Extended Mind” approach more 
broadly (Kiran and Verbeek 2010; Aydin 2013): the fact that the artefacts considered are of 
incommensurate economic value, for example; or that they do not have the same 
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sociological impact; or that they are entirely distinct as “archives,” since information 
uploaded to the [390] Internet is networked, “greased” and open to multiple users in a way 
that information written in a Filofax is not (Moor 1997). 
Insofar as it ignores such differences, it is possible to view “Extended Mind Thesis” 
as symptomatic of a subjectivist tendency in philosophical treatments of technology (Aydin 
2013). In relation to the Internet, it is possible to detect this in the so-called “neurological 
turn” in work by thinkers like Turkle, Lanier, and Bilton (Lovink 2010; Wong 2013). This turn 
has been characterised as “… an interiorisation of … [social and cultural] concerns over Web 
2.0” (Wong 2013, 196), and what is problematic about it from the perspective of this article 
is that it is not “transcendental” enough: instead of attempting to consider and critique 
norms involved in particular technologies, it leads towards a reified “Subject,” just as the 
deterministic tendency led towards a reified “Technology.” 
What renders these tendencies especially problematic in the case of the Internet is 
that, rather than critically examining extremes of rhetoric surrounding the technology, they 
can tend to support them. To illustrate, consider the following from Schmidt and Cohen’s 
The New Digital Age: 
  
[Through Internet technology] [o]ur own neurological limits, which lead us to 
forgetfulness and oversights, will be supplemented by information systems designed 
to support our needs. Two such examples are memory prosthetics – calendar 
reminders and to-do lists – and social prosthetics … Suggestion engines that offer 
alternative terms to help a user find what she is looking for will be a particularly 
useful aid in efficiency by consistently stimulating our thinking processes, ultimately 
enhancing our creativity, not pre-empting it (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 16-7). 
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While tending towards a rhetoric of optimism, this excerpt demonstrates both determinist 
and subjectivist tendencies: the former is evident in the characterisation of prosthetics as 
agents of change that unequivocally “will” bring about certain effects; the latter is evident in 
the use of “we” and “our” to reify a form of subjectivity which, it is presupposed, will 
unequivocally want the values of “supplementation” and “efficiency.” 
Such tendencies are also common in the work of thinkers tending towards 
pessimism. Consider, for example, the following from Carr’s The Shallows: 
 
Our use of the Internet involves many paradoxes, but the one that promises to have 
the greatest long-term influence over how we think is this one: the Net seizes our 
attention only to scatter it … The Net’s cacophony … [391] prevent[s] our minds from 
thinking either deeply or creatively (Carr 2010, 118-9). 
 
Here, the tendency towards determinism is even more pronounced: whereas Schmidt and 
Cohen describe varied technologies with different affordances, Carr reifies the “Net” into an 
agent capable of “seizing” and “scattering.” In contrast, his tendency towards subjectivism 
initially seems weaker, perhaps because it speaks from the perspective of a threatened 
subject. The paradox, however, is that this subject may only be threatened to the extent 
that it has a strong sense of itself; specifically, Carr seems to be speaking from the 
perspective of an entrenched Enlightenment subject that seeks to be “disengaged” and 
“autonomous,” and that views technological change per se as threatening (Wong 2013). 
From shared determinist and subjectivist tendencies, these excerpts arrive at 
diametrically opposed conclusions: Schmidt and Cohen are optimistic that prosthetics will 
“enhance,” not “pre-empt” creativity; Carr holds that the “Net” will definitively “prevent” it. 
This is an “antinomy” in the Kantian sense – a metaphysical deadlock resulting from faults in 
shared assumptions (Kant 2000, 459-559). Here, the deadlock is whether the Internet 
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enhances or impedes creativity; the assumptions are that determinist and subjectivist 
tendencies are appropriate to resolve this. 
Antinomies like these proliferate throughout contemporary popular literature on 
the Internet, generating excesses of both optimism and pessimism.7 The question facing us 
concerns how philosophy of technology might respond to them. This question, however, is 
in itself problematic, for seemingly contradictory reasons: first, it seems to presuppose too 
clear a distinction between “popular” and “philosophical” work; second, such a distinction is, 
as we have seen, made questionable by the fact that certain strands of philosophy of 
technology involve determinism and subjectivism. 
A way out of these difficulties is to emphasise the cohesion of approaches that 
engage particular technologies “transcendentally,” in terms of their conditions. One such 
approach is Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology, which involves a “two level 
instrumentalisation theory” that Feenberg does not hesitate to characterise as 
transcendental: 
 
[If we] analyse the transcendental conditions of meaning as well as function [we]… 
arrive at something resembling the two level instrumentalisation theory I have 
proposed. In that theory the most general functional conditions of possibility of 
technology appear as historical constants while the [392] conditions of realisation 
vary much more widely. Those latter conditions have to do with the ethical and 
aesthetic meaning of technologies … These aspects of technology are broken down 
into categories that reappear in varying configurations in different societies, but they 
do always appear and so can be properly considered essential conditions of 
possibility as well. (Feenberg 2009, 228) 
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Another such approach is Fuchs’ Critical Media and Information Studies, which draws on a 
Marxist philosophical legacy that he also does not hesitate to characterise as transcendental: 
 
All Marxist thinking to a certain extent contains transcendental elements … Marxist 
transcendentalism is materialist … [I]t is an immanent transcendentalism or 
transcendental immanentism. (Fuchs 2011, 27-8) 
 
At the beginning of this article, we witnessed Verbeek criticise “transcendental” approaches 
for valorising conditions of possibility that “... overstep and transcend … empirical reality …” 
(Verbeek 2005, 7). This criticism did not sufficiently reckon with approaches like those of 
Feenberg and Fuchs, which emphasise that transcendental conditions of possibility emerge 
from, and in strict relation to empirical reality. This is what Feenberg implies when he 
emphasises that functional conditions appear as “historical constants,” and that ethical and 
aesthetic conditions, although not “essential” in a strictly a priori sense, can be considered in 
this way when evaluating similarities and differences between them. Likewise, it is what 
Fuchs implies when situating his approach as an “immanent transcendentalism.” In both 
cases, we have approaches that claim: 1) that conditions of possibility are normative and 
should not be treated simply as naturally given “facts,” and, 2) that these conditions are not 
“eternal” or “universal,” but historically contingent. 
Recognising the compatibility of these claims allows Feenberg and Fuchs to pursue 
nuanced transcendental approaches that resist determinism and subjectivism: first, 
recognition of the gap between normative conditions and empirical reality allows for a 
critique of “Technology” and the “Subject” as historically contingent norms, and not as 
naturally given facts; second, recognition that conditions are contingent allows for nuanced 
empirical work on variations between these conditions – from politically focused case 
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studies of Minitel and the Japanese experience of globalisation in Feenberg’s work (2010), to 
sociological surveys of social media in that of Fuchs (2011).8 [393] 
 
3. The Idea of the Internet 
In the spirit of the avowedly “transcendental” aspects of the approaches of Feenberg and 
Fuchs, the aim of this part is to describe four core clusters of norms pertaining to the idea of 
the Internet. These norms are not intended to be “eternal” or “universal,” but contingent to 
this historical moment. Likewise, the set proposed is not intended to be exhaustive or 
uncontroversial; rather, it is intended to be suggestive, in favour of a broader transcendental 
approach to outlining the norms that condition the contemporary experience of the 
Internet.9 
 
3.1. Cluster 1: Neutrality 
The first norm is paradoxical. It is the norm that denies that the Internet is a set of norms. 
This presents the Internet as a naturalised fact, without selective norms in and of itself. 
Given this norm, it becomes paradoxical in at least two senses to claim that 
neutrality is a norm worthy of treatment in this context: first, because common sense takes 
it to be the absence of value; second, because, since Winner’s seminal article “Do Artifacts 
Have Politics?,” it is an established item of doxa in philosophy of technology that design 
practices are capable of investing artefacts with definite ethico-political norms (Winner 
1980; Latour 1992; Joerges 1999; Brey 2000; Verbeek 2005).  
With the established view, a thoroughgoing transcendental approach to the Internet 
would reject the common sense standpoint that technologies are neutral. The problem, 
however, is that the established view does not go far enough in considering that it is always 
possible, in principle, for “neutrality” to be re-invested into technologies, in line with what 
Žižek has diagnosed as “ideological fantasy”: 
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[W]e have established a new way to read [Marx’s famous definition of ideology in 
terms of] “they do not know it, but they are doing it”… [People today] know very 
well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. The 
illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring 
our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is 
what may be called the ideological fantasy. (Žižek 1989, 32-3) 
 
The ideological fantasy of neutrality with reference to the Internet consists in knowing that it 
has embedded norms, but behaving as if it did not.10 This fantasy is attractive because it 
foregoes the need to seek out and be critical of norms, and is not something that extant 
approaches to embedded values in philosophy of tech-[394]-nology, such as those of Brey 
(2000) and Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), are well placed to confront. This is because, 
post-Winner, these approaches tend to take the description and “exposure” (Brey 2000) of 
embedded values to be sufficient, without addressing the capacity of ideological fantasy to 
resist this. A way out of this problem, in line with the general argument of this article, is to 
move towards a more thoroughgoing transcendental approach that, by attending to the 
distinction between normative conditions and “empirical reality,” is capable of recognising 
the potential for “neutrality” itself to be paradoxically re-invested, as a norm. 
 
3.2. Cluster 2: Unity and Familiarity 
The second normative cluster holds that the Internet is a unified and familiar entity, such 
that all sites are, in principle, accessible from any point of access. This presents the Internet 
as an entity that is, in terms of its architecture, inherently open and democratic (Ryan 2010, 
31-44; Castells 2010, 385-94; Schmidt and Cohen 2013; Dean 2005). 
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The facts are that access to the Internet is always limited. Technically, it is limited by 
factors like encryption, censorship, and the “standardisation” of scripts (Bortzmeyer 2012). 
Socio-economically, it is limited by “digital divide” factors like geographical location as well 
as types of software and hardware affordable to the user (Borletti 2012). Cognitively, it is 
limited by factors like levels of attention and technical knowledge manifested in particular 
userships (Poster 2006, 231-49; Dean 2005, 66-9). 
But how are limitations like these reflected in everyday ways of referring to “the 
Internet”? In English, given what we have described, it would be factually appropriate to 
always refer to the Internet through the indefinite article, as suggested by Internet Studies 
pioneers such as Steve Jones (2002). That way, when one goes online, it would be 
acknowledged that one is accessing a limited set of sites and never the totality – “an 
Internet,” not “the Internet.” In English, such distinctions between the global and local are 
much better reflected in technical discourse, as in the distinction that Internet governance 
specialists make between the “Western” and “Chinese” Internets (Grumbach 2012, 403), or, 
for example, in the distinctions that engineers make between Wide-Area-Networks (WANs) 
and Long-Area-Networks (LANs) (Santi 2012). Nevertheless, it is a marked tendency of 
everyday natural language to simplify and overlook these distinctions, with problematic 
results. 
Today, Internet governance specialists report direct correlations between the 
process of language extinction and a process of globalisation in which ICTs and [395] the 
Internet are complicit (Prado 2012). This is because ICTs tend to promote certain 
“prestigious” languages at the expense of marginal and regional idioms (Prado 2012, 38-9; 
Oustinoff 2012b, 409; Borletti 2012, 358). At the risk of seeming to compound this error, it is 
worth considering two tendencies to have emerged in how so-called “prestigious” languages 
of European provenance make everyday reference to the Internet.11 First, there is a 
tendency exhibited in English, German, and Portuguese to retain use of a definite article 
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unrelated to an indefinite article, referring, respectively, to “the Internet,” “Das Internet,” or 
“A Internet.” Second, there is a tendency in Spanish, French, and Italian to drop the definite 
article, and refer simply to “Internet.” On one level, these tendencies could be viewed as 
mere atavisms of linguistic habit. Speculatively, however, we may suggest that they indicate 
a tendency to view the Internet as something singular, “global,” unified, and familiar. 
Re-consider the case of English, which, among “prestigious” languages, remains the 
most prevalent on the Internet, although its influence is waning.12 In what cases in everyday 
English do comparable repressions or omissions of the indefinite article occur? First, it is a 
tendency in English to reserve use of a definite article unrelated to an indefinite article for 
singular and unrepeatable events on a cosmological scale. Examples of this include “The Big 
Bang,” “The Birth of Christ,” or “The Birth of Mohamed,” each of which it would seem 
absurd to refer to through the indefinite article (“A Big Bang” or “A Birth of Christ”). Second, 
English omits both articles when referring to proper names, and use of the proper name 
alone, without qualifying formalities, tends to be reserved for cases where familiarity is 
presupposed.13 
From here, we may speculate that the two tendencies noted in “prestigious” 
European languages reflect a broader tendency, in line with a logic of globalisation, to 
idealise “the Internet” as an event that is at once singular and of cosmological importance; 
what gets overlooked by this is that access is always limited and that a plurality of 
“Internets” exist, cut off from one another by reified forms of economic, political, and social 
inequality (Fuchs 2011, 322-49; Dean 2005). 
 
3.3. Cluster 3: Connectivity, Novelty and Speed 
The third cluster holds that increased connectivity, novelty, and speed in communications 
are absolute virtues. This presents the Internet as offering infinite potential for the 
modification of knowing, communicating, and being. 
 21 
Eighteen years ago, Nicholas Negroponte, founder of MIT’s media-lab and one of the 
key Internet optimists before the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, [396] summed-up what 
he saw as the situation of connectivity, novelty, and speed at the fundamental level of 
Internet hardware as follows: 
 
Think of the capacity of fibre as if it were infinite. We literally do not know how 
many bits per second we can send down a fibre…. Research results indicate that we 
are close to being able to deliver 1,000 billion bits [1 Terabit] per second. This means 
that a fibre the size of a human hair can deliver every issue ever made of the Wall 
Street Journal in less than one second. (Negroponte 1996, 23) 
 
As of March 2001, the record for data transmission through a fibre optic cable had exceeded 
Negroponte’s figure by ten times, standing at 10,000 billion bits (10 Terabits) (Hecht 2001). 
As of September 2012, the figure had been exceeded a thousand times over, with the record 
for data transmission standing at 1 Petabit (1000 Terabits) per second (NTT 2012). 
Among Internet optimists, the tendency is to seize on statistics like these as 
fulfilment of the ontological and epistemological presuppositions implicit in Negroponte’s 
commentary (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 3-11). Ontologically, Negroponte implies that we 
should act “as if” the being of fibre optics offers infinite potential for fast and novel data 
transfer. Epistemologically, he implies that, since “we … do not know” how many bits per 
second can be sent down a fibre, research should always push this threshold. 
What these figures also record is that, at the material level of Internet technology, 
increases in connectivity, novelty, and speed are presupposed to be absolute virtues. In 
terms of the research this makes possible, there is nothing objectionable about this: it is 
simply a principle for exploring the potentialities of a particular type of matter. As the first 
part of this article sought to show, however, and as the weight of work in politically- and 
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sociologically- oriented philosophy of technology and Science and Technology Studies 
supports (Winner 1993; Latour 2007; Fuchs 2011; Feenberg 2012), “the Internet” is not 
reducible to the material level on which this research takes place. A problem, therefore, 
arises when the principle is taken as a default for other types of hardware, software, and 
usership implicated in the broader phenomenon of the Internet. 
If the principle is that fast and novel data connections should be made because they 
can be made, and if this is taken as a default for the entire Internet, it raises the spectre of 
the potentially limitless supersession and obsolescence of all types of hardware, software, 
and usership implicated in the phenomenon. Whereas optimists might be inclined to view 
this as a form of online Schumpeterian “cre-[397]-ative destruction” (Castells 2010, 215), 
pessimists are inclined to meet it by reifying connectivity, novelty, and speed as essential 
characteristics of an unstoppable and technologically deterministic “Internet” (Morozov 
2013). As we saw above, however, the problem with both these tendencies is that they are 
insufficiently transcendental: instead of considering the Internet as a whole with 
qualitatively diverse conditions and parts, they mistake a perception of developments at the 
fundamental level of hardware for the whole. 
A more promising transcendental trajectory involves situating the Internet itself 
within broader wholes; that is, by analysing it in terms of its economic, political, and 
sociological conditions. When this occurs, it emerges in terms of how contemporary 
globalised capitalism esteems novelty, connectivity, and speed as core values (Dean 2005; 
Feenberg 2012; Castells 2010, 500-9). What is equally important from the perspective of this 
article, however, is that such approaches should not lose sight of how these values manifest 
themselves phenomenologically. This is crucial if they are to contribute to a more 
thoroughgoing “transcendental” approach aimed at investigating how values involved in the 
Internet manifest themselves at diverse levels, and is something that can be achieved by 
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considering the habits of production and reception that particular forms of Internet-based 
technology and media encourage. 
To develop this, consider the example of the Wall Street Journal from Negroponte’s 
above commentary. Quantitatively, it is trivial: whether one wants to download every issue 
of the Wall Street Journal or the entire oeuvre of a novelist, the scale is the same: in each 
case, one is dealing merely with “atoms” that have been transferred into “bits” (Negroponte 
1996, 11-3). The problem, however, is that such an equivalence does not hold qualitatively, 
whether on a political, a sociological, or a phenomenological level. 
The Wall Street Journal is a daily newspaper dealing in the fluctuations of stock 
markets; whether in the case of the first broadsheet of 1889 or the online version of today, 
its writers and readers are united in the (capitalist) presupposition that the words it contains 
will deal in vast networks of connectivity, novelty, and speed and that their value as “news” 
will be quickly superseded. The problem arises, then, when values like these, reified by what 
Feenberg calls the “consumption model” of the Internet (2012, 11-2), or by what Dean calls 
“communicative capitalism” (Dean 2005, 54-7), are taken to apply for all other forms of 
communication. What gets esteemed by these models, according to Dean, is the mere 
circulation of messages, independent of the value of their content or the status of their 
senders and receivers (2005, 58). What gets overlooked, on the other hand, [398] are forms 
of communication that demand more time consuming conditions of production and that aim 
at more enduring transmissions of meaning. Viewed as “bits” of information, these forms, 
including works of art, science, philosophy, literature, and investigative journalism, are the 
ontological equivalents of news snippets, adverts, and stock market figures; in terms of why 
and how they are produced, however, they are incommensurable, whether considered on a 
political, sociological, or phenomenological level. 
 
3.4. Cluster 4: Supersession and Integration 
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The fourth cluster holds that the Internet is capable of superseding and integrating all other 
forms of communication. This presents the Internet as a telos for previous media. 
The contemporary Internet is still predominantly text based (Adegbola 2012, 319), 
but as a digital medium capable of reducing discrete media to the common denominator of 
the bit, it seems, according to a pervasive rhetoric that goes hand-in-hand with the 
“consumption model” and “communicative capitalism,” to offer potentially limitless capacity 
for incorporating other media: from photographs of cave paintings and old masters, to 
books, money, audio, video, and even material things, as heralded, in different ways, by 3D 
printing (Rifkin 2014, 89-109) and the so-called “Internet of Things” (Ashton 2009). On this 
view, digitisation works like an applied form of Hegelian sublation (1977, 479-95), effecting 
with one and the same gesture the negation of diffuse “old” media while recuperating their 
content for “new” media. 
How can this be approached transcendentally, in terms of its conditions? Since the 
sublative model implies a telos, it may be worth starting near the end of the story outlined 
above, then working back: what, then, is the “Internet of Things,” and what are its 
conditions of possibility? 
According to the originator of the term, Kevin Ashton, the “Internet of Things” 
outlines a vision of a fully networked world where “things” are no longer “… dependent on 
human beings for information”; rather, through Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology, “we … empower [things] with their own means of gathering information, so they 
can see, hear and smell the world for themselves” (2009). As Mattern and Floerkemeier 
elaborate: 
 
The Internet of Things represents a vision in which the Internet extends into the real 
world embracing everyday objects. Physical items are no longer disconnected from 
the virtual world, but can be controlled remotely and can act as physical access 
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points to Internet services. An Internet of Things [399] makes computing truly 
ubiquitous … Using sensors [Smart objects] are able to perceive their context, and 
via built-in networking capabilities they [are] able to communicate with each other, 
access Internet services and interact with people. (2010, 107) 
 
What are the conditions for this vision? First, a traditional metaphysical dualism: on one 
side, the “disconnected” “virtual world” of the contemporary Internet, where things, Ashton 
writes, “are almost wholly dependent on human beings for information” (2009); on the 
other, the “real world” of impoverished “everyday objects.” Second, the telos which is 
expected to sublate this, according to Mattern and Floerkemeier, is computing made “truly 
ubiquitous” through the “Internet of Things.” 
“Truly ubiquitous” is a rhetorical elaboration on Weiser’s concept of “ubiquitous 
computing” (1991); if it is vague as a criterion, this may be because it is more expressive of a 
prior transcendental evaluation than an expected future state of affairs. 
This relates to Castells’ concept of “real virtuality,” as discussed earlier. Elaborating 
on this, Castells writes: 
 
There is no separation between “reality” and [“virtual”] symbolic representation. In 
all societies humankind has existed in and acted through a symbolic environment … 
[W]hat is historically specific to the new communication system, organised around 
the electronic integration of all communication modes from the typographic to the 
multisensorial, is not its inducement of virtual reality but the construction of real 
virtuality. (Castells 2010, 403) 
 
On this account, “physical items” have never been “disconnected from the virtual world” in 
the manner required by Mattern and Floerkemeier’s concept of “truly ubiquitous” 
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computing. This is because, for Castells, “virtual reality” does not refer to a domain that is 
separate from the “real world,” so much as to the “symbolic environment” in which real 
world communications have always taken place. As he elaborates: 
 
[R]eality, as experienced, has always been virtual because it is always perceived 
through symbols that frame practice with some meaning that escapes their strict 
semantic definition. (Castells 2010, 403) 
 
What is historically novel, Castells claims, is “real virtuality.” As discussed earlier, he 
characterises this in terms of a culture “in which … digitised networks [400] … have become 
so inclusive of all cultural expressions and personal experiences that they have made 
virtuality a fundamental dimension of our reality” (2010, xxix-xxxi). This concept differs from 
“truly ubiquitous” computing and the “Internet of Things” insofar as it is transcendentally 
reflexive – whereas the latter two concepts are conditioned by an unexamined metaphysical 
dualism, Castells characterises “real virtuality” as a construction contingent on the prior 
acceptance of “organising” values that aim at the supersession and integration of previous 
media. 
It is transcendentally naïve for Mattern and Floerkemeier to claim that “the Internet 
of Things represents a vision in which the Internet extends into the real world embracing 
everyday objects.” This is because the Internet is already present in the real world, not as a 
“virtual world” to which it refers, nor simply as a network that links it up, but as a 
transcendentally conditioning set of values (including those of supersession and integration) 
that is normative of the forms of communication that take place in the contemporary 
“symbolic environment”; empirically, this is evident in diverse phenomena, such as the 
tendency of other media (whether “new” or “old”) to make ubiquitous reference to the 
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Internet and to mimic the “participatory” and “interactive” norms of new media (Poster 
2006). 
 
4. For a Transcendental Turn 
Having suggested this small set of norms, this article will now conclude in favour of a turn in 
perspective upon them: away from an approach which, by ignoring the transcendental, 
apprehends entities like the Internet in a narrowly empirical sense; towards an approach 
that opens the way for an expanded philosophy of technology, capable of being 
concomitantly better focused on both empirical issues of fact and transcendental issues 
concerning our presuppositions on the conditions for these facts. 
Towards the end of the Critique of Pure Reason’s “Transcendental Dialectic,” Kant 
claims: 
 
If one can show that although the three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, 
cosmological and theological) cannot be referred directly to any object 
corresponding to them … and nevertheless that all rules of the empirical use of 
reason under the presupposition of such an object … lead to systematic unity … then 
it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed in accordance with such ideas. And this 
is the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason, not as 
constitutive principles …, but as regulative principles. (Kant 2000, 606) [401] 
 
What this passage implies is that, were he to have encountered it, Kant would have viewed 
the Internet as a “regulative idea” that subjects its users to a species of “transcendental 
illusion.” 
For Kant, a transcendental illusion is a mistake made necessary by the limits of human 
reason. This is to say that Kant takes there to be certain ideas which human reason cannot 
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fail to reify, even though the entities to which these ideas are presumed to refer can never 
be the object of an experience. Kant famously deals with three such entities, each 
corresponding to one of the “transcendental ideas” outlined above: 
 
 The psychological idea of the self or soul, as that which persists throughout 
empirical changes undergone by the human subject. 
 The cosmological idea of the totality of the world or universe, as a completely linked 
system of causes and effects. 
 The theological idea of God, as the purely rational first cause of all that exists. 
 
These ideas provoke a “transcendental illusion” in the following sense: empirically, they 
cannot be the direct object of an experience; normatively or “transcendentally,” however, 
they are presupposed as conditions for the possibility of the types of experience to which 
Kant takes human beings to be subject. This is to say that, for Kant, although one can never 
encounter one’s identical soul, the linked totality of all that exists, or God as the object of an 
experience, one ought to presuppose them as ideas so that one’s thinking and one’s ethical 
conduct within the world will be coherent and meaningful (Kant 1996, 226-58). 
Kant’s way of expressing this, as in the above passage, is to view these ideas, not as 
“constitutive,” but “regulative.” By this, he means that it is not a really existing “soul,” 
“world totality,” or “God” that impresses the ideas, from “outside,” as it were, but rather 
human reason that prescribes them, as rules for behaviour. This is to say that the “soul,” the 
“world totality,” and “God” are, for Kant, more fundamentally sets of norms than facts, 
originating not from objective states of affairs, but rather from an impulse to give 
coherency, unity, and sense to thought and action in the face of such states of affairs. 
Having suggested this potential Kantian transcendental framework for viewing the 
Internet, I will now conclude this article with three further suggestions that will gradually 
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take us away from the metaphysical and normative presuppositions that are involved in it, in 
favour of an expanded sense of the “transcendental” [402] that may have the potential to 
open new avenues of research in philosophy of technology. 
The first suggestion is that the Internet, in addition to any of the hardware, software 
and types of usership implicated in it, is a transcendental idea, which is to say a set of norms 
that is not manifest as an object of experience in the same way as the other elements are. 
This suggestion breaks with Kant’s stronger claim that the transcendental ideas he deduces 
(“God”, the “soul,” and the “world”) are a universal and eternal a priori set; rather, as I have 
attempted to show in this article, the set of norms involved in the case of the Internet is 
historically related to developments in hardware, software, and types of usership, and this is 
why detailed empirical work of the type carried out by Feenberg (2010) and Fuchs (2011) is 
required to determine where and how these norms are manifest. 
  The second suggestion is that the act of critiquing these norms reveals them to be 
regulative, not “constitutive.” In the previous part, four normative clusters pertaining to the 
idea of the Internet were outlined. These norms, I suggest, are regulative. This means that, 
like Kant’s ideas of the soul, “the world totality,” and God, they are proposed as if they 
originated from an experienceable entity. Thus, “the Internet,” in turn, can appear as 
determining or constitutive for the thought and action of certain types of subject in relation 
to it. What differs between the cases of Kant’s ideas and that of the Internet, I suggest, is not 
the regulative form of the proposition, but rather the type of rationality that does the 
proposing, and the type of subject to whom it is proposed. In Kant’s case, a unified reason is 
presupposed, and it is taken to regulate thought and action a priori, in accordance with the 
enlightenment ideal of “man,” the rational subject. In the case of the Internet, plural and 
competing rationalities are involved in the production of different forms of subjectivity – 
including, for example, the rationalities of political action groups, leisure and entertainment, 
and of marketing, consumerism, and capitalism. 
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The third suggestion is that, if any of the particulars of the Kantian approach 
outlined in this part should seem anachronistic or unappealing, this should not distract from 
a broader point: Kant’s “transcendental idealism” is only one example of a more general 
transcendental approach, and recognition of this has the potential to make philosophy of 
technology concomitantly better focused on both empirical issues of fact and transcendental 
issues concerning our presuppositions on the conditions for these facts. 
At the beginning of this article, we saw Verbeek situate Kant at “the zenith” of 
transcendental philosophy. This was an ironic tribute, based on a caricature of the 
transcendental as an otherworldly “realm.” Of the two terms involved in Kant’s [403] 
“transcendental idealism,” however, Verbeek focused on the wrong one: if either term 
denotes “otherworldly” metaphysical presuppositions, it is “idealism”14; “transcendental” 
simply stands for a philosophical approach involving critical enquiry into the conditions of 
experience. 
Understanding that “transcendental” denotes an approach and not a “realm” takes 
Kant down from his zenith and places him within a rich lineage of thinkers to have pursued 
this approach. An inexhaustive list of those to have done so would, I suggest, include Hume, 
Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Husserl, Frege, Wittgenstein, Deleuze, Derrida, and 
Habermas: insofar as these thinkers enquire critically into the conditions of experience, they 
think “transcendentally”; insofar as they enquire in diverse ways, making diverse 
metaphysical presuppositions explicit along the way, they demonstrate the evolution of the 
transcendental approach, considered as an approach that problematizes presuppositions on 
the conditions for the objects of thought and experience. 
The transcendental approach is not, however, restricted to “classical” philosophical 
thinkers, nor even to philosophy per se. On the contrary, its influence can be observed in 
diverse contemporary disciplines, as I have attempted to highlight with reference to 
contemporary philosophy of technology (Feenberg), sociology (Fuchs, Castells), and media 
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studies (Chun, Dean). In each of these cases we find approaches that are, I suggest, vitally 
“transcendental” insofar as they enquire critically into the conditions of contemporary 
thought and experience. 
Since philosophy of technology’s “empirical turn,” a doxa has blocked the field’s 
potential to engage with the history of the transcendental in philosophy, and, correlatively, 
to bring the resources of this approach to bear on technologies like the Internet that exceed 
established forms of common sense on what constitutes an empirical object. In an attempt 
to work against the first issue, this article has referred to Kant. In an attempt to work against 
the second, it has referred to the case of the Internet. The paradoxical conclusion to emerge 
from this is that philosophy of technology can become more empirically focused on 
technological facts and phenomena by becoming more, not less, “transcendentally” focused 
on their conditions – the key, I suggest, is not to disavow either the transcendental or the 
empirical, but to try to think further in both directions. 
                                                 
Notes:  
1 The Internet is the “network of networks” through which data transfer occurs between Internet 
Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) enabled computers. In a less formal sense, “the Internet” is used in English to 
cover related but technically non-synonymous terms [404] (from everyday contractions like “the Net,” 
“the World Wide Web,” and “the Web,” to more idiomatic descriptions like “Interwebs’ and ‘Web 
2.0”). Where further qualification is not given, this article uses the term in the less formal sense 
(following the practice of Wong 2013, and of Beer and Burrows 2007). 
2 My use of the term “doxa” here is strategic, and related to the preceding claim that the aim of this 
article may seem ‘paradoxical’. I take the extract from Verbeek to express a form of contemporary 
“doxa” or “common sense” in philosophy of technology, according to which “transcendental” 
approaches abstract from the empirical and are not ‘fine-grained’ enough to do justice to the nuances 
of case studies of technologies in action; in contrast to this, the aim of this essay is para-doxical (that 
is, “against doxa”) insofar as it tries to demonstrate that transcendental approaches can be 
empirically nuanced, and, further, that certain technologies (such as the Internet) may be so in excess 
of established senses of “the empirical” as to require avowedly transcendental treatments. The sense 
of “paradox” deployed here owes a lot to Deleuze (see, for example, 2004, 164-208). 
3 The structure of a transcendental argument is as follows: 
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[T]ranscendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, 
namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y – where then, given that Y is the 
case, it logically follows that X must be the case too. (Stern 2013) 
 
I take it that this structure can be used to support diverse metaphysical positions (for example: Kant’s 
“transcendental idealism,” Marx’s “historical materialism,” and Deleuze’s “transcendental 
empiricism”), and that the “transcendental” approach is not tied to, for example, Kant’s 
“transcendental idealism.” For more on this, see part four below. 
4 With reference to endnote 3, “Y” and “X” in this article are, respectively, “the Internet” and “a set of 
values or norms.” The argument of the article is that X is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
Y, and that the contents of X are historically contingent. 
5 See endnote 4 above. Against Stroud’s focus on epistemology, Stern suggests that transcendental 
arguments have a more promising outlook in ethics (Stern 2013). 
6 It is tempting, but potentially misleading, to see a neat fit between the elements identified here and 
an Aristotelian causal taxonomy (Aristotle 1995, 1600). For a more detailed contemporary taxonomy, 
see Søraker 2011. 
7 They arise over such issues as whether the Internet enhances or debases culture and morality, 
cognition, political engagement, and our senses of “self,” “place,” and “embodiment.” On the 
optimistic spectrum, we find writers like Kelly (2011), Bilton (2010), Shirky (2010), and Kurzweil 
(2005). On the pessimistic spectrum, we [405] find Franzen (2013), Keen (2007), Turkle (2011), Lanier 
(2013), and Morozov (2013). For a more thoroughgoing survey of these tendencies, see Wong 2013. 
8 The approaches of Feenberg and Fuchs are transcendental, but do not fit Verbeek’s caricature of 
“classical” philosophy of technology. Something they arguably do lack, however, is a sufficiently 
developed phenomenological dimension, focused on the experience of artefacts. A transcendental 
approach that fused the two would, like the “postphenomenology” of Ihde (1993, 2012) and Verbeek 
(2005, 2011), describe how experience is conditioned in the use of particular technologies, but would 
also devote deeper critical attention to the political and sociological norms involved in conditioning 
these technologies. For reasons of space, the following part of this article can only suggest such an 
approach, but it is something I intend to pursue in further work. 
9 Very speculatively, the approach developed in this part may be considered a post-Husserlian form of 
“imaginative variation” (Husserl 1988, 69-72). By this, I mean that it is an attempt to distinguish 
between the contingent and (relatively) invariant features involved in how the idea of “the Internet” 
is presented. 
10 See, for example, Dean on the “fantasy of abundance” in the context of the Internet (2005, 59-60). 
In broader terms, current debates on “net neutrality” are worthy of consideration in this context (Wu 
2014). 
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11 The aim here is not to compound the error of linguistic marginalisation, but to critique it from the 
inside by drawing attention to how so-called “prestigious” languages are complicit in promoting this 
error through their prevalent everyday ways of referring to “the Internet.” With the exception of 
Italian, the six languages considered here are all among the top ten used on the Internet (Borletti 
2012, 361-2), and are distinct from the remaining five (Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Russian, and 
Korean) in that they use definite and indefinite articles in comparable ways. The remaining five 
languages are closer to the second tendency in terms of how they refer to the Internet (respectively: 
互聯網, インターネット, تنرتنلإا, Интернет, 인터넷). 
12 English constituted 75% of Internet content in 1998, but is down to below 30% today (Prado 2012, 
39). 
13 When one refers to “Friedrich,” “Virginia,” or “Coke,” and not to “Herr Nietzsche,” “Mrs. Woolf,” or 
the “Coca Cola Company,” what is presupposed is familiarity. 
14 It is, for example, these presuppositions which lead Kant to his restricted set of “regulative” ideas 
including “God,” “the soul,” and “the world,” all three of which are classic themes in idealist 
philosophy (as witnessed in the work of Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz). [406]  
 
References: 
Achterhuis, Hans. 2001. American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn, trans. 
Robert P. Crease. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Adegbola, Tunde. 2012. “Multimedia and Signed, Written or Oral Languages.” In NET.LANG: 
Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and Hervé Le Crosnier, 310-23. 
Caen: C&F Editions. 
Aristotle. 1995. Metaphysics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. 
William David Ross. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ashton, K. 2009. “That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing.” RFID Journal. 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986. Accessed June 3, 2014. 
Aydin, Ciano. 2013. “The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside-Outside’ Dualism in the 
Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition.” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-013-9319-x#. Accessed June 4, 2014. 
Beer, David., and Roger Burrows. 2007. “Sociology and, of and in Web 2.0: Some Initial 
Considerations.” Sociological Research Online 12 (5). 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/5/17.html. Accessed June 3, 2014. 
Bilton, Nick. 2010. I Live in the Future & Here’s How It Works. New York: Crown Business. 
 34 
                                                                                                                                            
Borletti, Isabella Pierangeleni. 2012. “Describing the World: Multilingualism, The Internet 
and Human Rights.” In NET.LANG: Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini 
and Hervé Le Crosnier, 353-71. Caen: C&F Editions. 
Bortzmeyer, Stéphane. “Multilingualism and the Internet’s Standardisation,” trans. John 
Rossbottom. In NET.LANG: Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and 
Hervé Le Crosnier, 104-17. Caen: C&F Editions. 
Brey, Philip. 2000. “Disclosive Computer Ethics: The Exposure and Evaluation of Embedded 
Normativity in Computer Technology.” Computers and Society 30 (4): 10-16. 
Brey, Philip. 2008. “Technology and Everything of Value.” University of Twente Inaugural 
Speech. 
http://www.utwente.nl/gw/wijsb/organization/brey/Publicaties_Brey/Brey_2008_Oratie-
ENG.pdf. Accessed June 3, 2014. 
Brey, Philip. 2010. “Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn.” Techné: Research in 
Philosophy and Technology 14:1: 36-48. 
http://www.utwente.nl/gw/wijsb/organization/brey/Publicaties_Brey/Brey_2010_PoT_Empi
rical.pdf. Accessed June 3, 2014. 
Carr, Nicholas. 2010. The Shallows: How the Internet is Changing the Way We Think, Read 
and Remember. London: Atlantic. 
Castells, Manuel. 2010. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. [407] 
Chalmers, David. 2010. “Foreword.” In Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, 
Action and Cognitive Extension, ix-xxv. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chun, Wendy. 2011. Programmed Vision: Software and Memory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 2010. “The Extended Mind.” In Andy Clark, Supersizing the 
Mind, 220-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dean, Jodi. 2005. “Communicative Capitalism: Circulation and the Foreclosure of Politics.” 
Cultural Politics 1(1): 51-74. 
Deleuze, Gilles. 2004. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. London: Continuum. 
Dusek, Val. 2006. Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ellul, Jacques. 1980. The Technological System, trans. Joachim Neugroschel. New York: 
Continuum. 
Feenberg, Andrew. 1999. Questioning Technology. London: Routledge. 
Feenberg, Andrew. 2002. Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 35 
                                                                                                                                            
Feenberg, Andrew. 2009. “Peter-Paul Verbeek: Review of What Things Do.” Human Studies 
32 (2): 225-8. 
Feenberg, Andrew. 2010. Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and 
Modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, Jerry. 2009. “Where Is My Mind?” London Review of Books 31 (3): 13-15. 
Franzen, Jonathan. 2013. The Kraus Project. London: Fourth Estate. 
Fuchs, Christian. 2011. Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies. London: 
Routledge. 
Graham, Gordon. 1999. The Internet: A Philosophical Enquiry. London: Routledge. 
Grumbach, Stéphane. 2012. “The Internet in China.” In NET.LANG: Towards the Multilingual 
Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and Hervé Le Crosnier, 400-5. Caen: C&F Editions. 
Hecht, Jeff. 2001. “Fiber Crosses the 10-Trillion Bit Barrier.” MIT Technology Review. 
http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/12315/. Accessed June 3, 2014. 
Hegel, Georg W. F. 1977. The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Arnold Vincent Miller. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. 
William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row. 
Hurley, Susan. 2010. “The Varieties of Externalism.” In The Extended Mind, ed. Richard. 
Menary, 101-54. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [408] 
Husserl, Edmund. 1988. Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ihde, Don. 1993. Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Ihde, Don. 2012. Experimental Phenomenology, Second Edition: Multistabilities, Albany: 
SUNY Press. 
Introna, Lucas., and Helen Nissenbaum. 2000. “Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search 
Engines Matters.” The Information Society 16:169–85. 
Jones, Steven. G. 2002. “The Internet and Its Social Landscape.” In Virtual Culture: Identity & 
Communication in Cyberspace, ed. Steven. G. Jones, 7-35. London: Sage. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1996. The Critique of Practical Reason. In Immanuel Kant, Practical 
Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen. W. Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 36 
                                                                                                                                            
Keen, Andrew. 2007. The Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet is Killing Our Culture and 
Assaulting Our Economy. London: Nicholas Brealey. 
Kelly, Kevin. 2011. What Technology Wants. New York: Viking. 
Kiran, Asle. H., and Peter-Paul Verbeek. 2010. “Trusting Our Selves to Technology.” 
Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23: 409-27. 
Kurzweil, Raymond. 2005. The Singularity Is Near. New York: Viking. 
Lanier, Jaron. 2013. Who Owns the Future? London: Allen Lane. 
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Latour, Bruno. 2007. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Lovink, Geert. 2010. “MyBrain.net: the Colonization of Real-Time and Other Trends in Web 
2.0.” Eurozine, 18 March 2010. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-0318-lovink-
en.html. Accessed June 5, 2014. 
Mattern, Freidemann., and Christian Floerkemeier. 2010. “From the Internet of Computers 
to the Internet of Things.” Informatik-Spektrum 33 (2): 107–21. 
Menary, Richard. 2006. “Attacking the Bounds of Cognition.” Philosophical Psychology 19: 
329-44. 
Miller, Mark. 2005. Internet Technologies Handbook: Optimizing the IP Network. Hoboken: 
Wiley. 
Moor, James. H. 1997. “Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age.” Computers and 
Society 27 (3): 27-32.  
Morozov, Evgeny. 2013. To Save Everything Click Here: Technology, Solutionism and the Urge 
to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist. London: Allen Lane. [409] 
Negroponte, Nicholas. 1996. Being Digital. London: Coronet Books. 
Oustinoff, Michaël. 2012a. “English Won’t Be the Internet’s Lingua Franca.” In NET.LANG: 
Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and Hervé Le Crosnier, 55-67. 
Caen: C&F Editions. 
Oustinoff, Michaël. 2012b. “The Economy of Languages.” In NET.LANG: Towards the 
Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and Hervé Le Crosnier, 409-20. Caen: C&F 
Editions. 
Poster, Mark. 2006. Information Please: Culture and Politics in the Age of Digital Machines. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
 37 
                                                                                                                                            
Prado, Daniel. 2012. “Language Presence in the Real World and Cyberspace.” In NET.LANG: 
Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace, ed. Laurent Vannini and Hervé Le Crosnier, 37-51. 
Caen: C&F Editions. 
Rifkin, Jeremy. 2014. The Zero Marginal Cost Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ryan, Johnny. 2010. A History of the Internet and the Digital Future. London: Reaktion Books. 
Santi, P. 2012. Mobility Models for Next Generation Wireless Networks: Ad Hoc, Vehicular 
and Mesh Networks. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 
Schäfer, Mirko. T. 2011. Bastard Culture!: How User Participation Transforms Cultural 
Production. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Schmidt, Eric., and Jared Cohen. 2013. The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, 
Business, Nations. New York: New Haven. 
Shirky, Clay. 2010. Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age. London: 
Allen Lane. 
Søraker, Johnny H. 2011. “Virtual Entities, Environments, World and Reality – Suggested 
Definitions and Taxonomy.” In Trust and Virtual Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. 
Charles Ess and May Thorseth, 44-74. Bern: Peter Lang Publishing. 
Stern, Robert. 2013. “Transcendental Arguments.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/transcendental-arguments/. 
Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard. 2004. Mécréance et discrédit (1): La décadence des démocraties 
industrielles, Paris: Galilée. 
Stiegler, Bernard. 2010. Ce qui fait que la vie vaut la peine d’être vécue : de la 
pharmacologie, Paris: Flammarion. [410]. 
Stiegler, Bernard. 2012. Etats de choc: bêtise et savoir au XXIème siècle, Paris: Editions 
Fayard. 
Stiegler, Bernard, George Collins, Marc Crépon, Catherine Perret, and Caroline Stiegler. 
2008. Réenchanter le monde: La valeur esprit contre le populisme industriel. Paris: 
Flammarion. 
Stiegler, Bernard, Alain Giffard, and Christian Fauré. 2009. Pour en finir avec la mécroissance. 
Paris: Flammarion. 
Stroud, Barry. 1968. “Transcendental Arguments.” The Journal of Philosophy 65 (9): 241-56. 
 38 
                                                                                                                                            
Turkle, Sherry. 2011. Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from 
Each Other. New York: Basic Books. 
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2005. What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency 
and Design. Philadelphia: Penn State Press. 
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2011. Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the 
Morality of Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Weiser, Mark. 1991. “The Computer for the 21st Century”, Scientific American 265(9): 66-75. 
Winner, Langdon. 1980. “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109 (1): 121-36. 
Winner, Langdon. 1993. “Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social 
Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 18 
(3): 362-78. 
Wong, Pak-Hang. 2013. “From Culture 2.0 to a Network State of Mind: A Selective History of 
Web 2.0’s Axiologies and a Lesson from It.” tripleC 11 (1): 191-206. http://triple-
c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/468. 
Wu, Timothy. 2014. “Net Neutrality and the Idea of America.” New Yorker, May 16, 2014. 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2014/05/net-neutrality-and-the-idea-
of-america.html. Accessed June 4, 2014. 
Zittrain, Jonathan. 2008. The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso. 
